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THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978 AND THE MISSED 
OPPORTUNITY TO APPLY THE ACT IN GUARDIANSHIPS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
State courts have had over two decades to mold the Indian Child Welfare 
Act of 1978 (“ICWA” or “the Act”)1 into a mechanism for protecting Indian 
heritage while simultaneously providing the ideal nurturing conditions for 
Indian children who are the subjects of custodial proceedings involving a non-
parent.2  Although there are no typical ICWA cases, each case poses common 
procedural requirements, and the Act, like any other federal statute, is best 
served by uniform compliance.3  Even so, judges, attorneys and caseworkers 
are unfamiliar with or resistant to ICWA, therefore necessitating critical 
consideration of the purpose of the Act.4  This is especially true because of the 
greater frequency of ICWA cases in recent years.5  Since the statute was 
enacted, well over 250 court decisions have shaped the area of Indian child 
law.6  Thus, very clearly, a need exists for a better understanding of ICWA and 
the intricacies involved in its function. 
Too often, courts struggle with the Act’s application because it is not clear 
as to the circumstances that require its use.7  One situation that has yet to be 
addressed in any major court decision and which poses potentially damaging 
 
 1. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-63 (1994). 
 2. See generally Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989); see also 
In re Shawboose, 438 N.W.2d 272 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); In re Adoption of S.S., 622 N.E.2d 
832 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). 
 3. Helen Ann Yunis & Katherine Scotta, The Indian Child Welfare Act: A Case Study, 2 
MICH. CHILD WELFARE J. 14, 14 (1998). 
 4. Id. 
 5. B.J. Jones, The Indian Child Welfare Act – The need for a separate law, American Bar 
Association (Aug. 29, 2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/genpractice/compleat/ 
f95child.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2000) 
 6. Id. 
 7. Peter K. Wahl, Little Power to Help Brenda? A Defense of the Indian Child Welfare Act 
and Its Continued Implementation in Minnesota, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 811, 836 (2000).  
Wahl suggests that “officials do not follow ICWA as strictly as they should,” “continued disdain 
for protecting Indian culture appears prevalent among those expected to be most instrumental in 
preservation” and “there is a lack of knowledge regarding ICWA and the need for cultural 
preservation.”  Wahl also refers to a January 1992 study in Hennepin County, Minnesota, which 
makes clear, he contends, that “greater attention to ICWA is necessary in many areas in order to 
comply with federal law.”  Id. 
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effects on Indian tribes, Indian children and Indian culture as such is the 
creation and termination of guardianships. Although many state statutes 
require the presiding judge to routinely inquire as to whether a child in a 
custody proceeding is an Indian,8 they do not indicate that guardianships are 
considered child custody proceedings that require the same inquiry into Indian 
tribe membership.9  As a result, a situation is created where a major mistake 
can be made in overlooking ICWA’s applicability. 
The Act clearly applies to guardianship proceedings where the parent or 
Indian custodian cannot have the child returned upon demand, even if parental 
rights have not been terminated.10  Reasons for this oversight involve a 
combination of ignorance and disdain for federal law.11  Because state 
statutory schemes, court rules and case law normally do not include a 
guardianship proceeding as a child custody proceeding,12 it becomes easy for a 
state judge to simply conclude that ICWA does not apply to Indian children in 
guardianships.  Furthermore, many litigators and judges assume ICWA only 
applies when the state, and not a private party, is seeking an out-of-home 
placement.  Moreover, the Act was intended to govern not only state and 
county social services programs, but judicial practices as well; state regulations 
are not directed at courts, thus leaving it to judges or the parties to invoke 
ICWA themselves. 
The purpose of this legislative Note is to recognize the tendency of courts 
to make this mistake and to encourage the correction of the oversight in order 
to remain consistent with the congressional intent of preserving Indian heritage 
in determining the living arrangements that would be in the best interests of the 
Indian child.  Part II is an examination of the policies that drove Congress to 
enact ICWA.  Critical attention is given to the special standard adopted for 
considering the best interests of the Indian child, the constitutionality of the 
legislation and the Act’s success in achieving Congress’s purpose.  Part II also 
provides the backdrop for explaining the Act’s justification and application to 
child custody proceedings. 
Part III is a discussion of the proceedings which are covered and which are 
not covered by the Act and the importance of involving tribal courts when 
possible.  This necessitates mentioning three critical aspects of the Act: 
jurisdictional requirements, the tribal notice requirement and placement 
 
 8. Interview with Hon. Michael Anderegg, Michigan Tribal Court (Oct. 20, 2000). 
 9. 25 U.S.C. § 1903. 
 10. Id.  Conversely, the implication is that if a guardianship exists where the parent or Indian 
custodian has relinquished the child but can have her returned upon request, then ICWA is 
inapplicable. 
 11. See Yunis & Scotta, supra note 3, at 14. 
 12. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a “custody hearing” as “[a] 
judicial examination of the facts relating to parental custody in a divorce or separation 
proceeding”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2002] THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978 215 
preferences of Indian children.  Part IV discusses the special situation of 
ICWA guardianships, explains the potential for misconstruing this aspect of 
the federal legislation and provides illustrations of the rare cases where courts 
properly identified ICWA guardianships. 
Part V is an analysis of whether courts are correctly identifying ICWA 
guardianships and a study of state statutes and court rules which aid in ICWA 
litigation.  It also includes an analysis of other aspects of ICWA guardianships, 
including the balance of rights between the guardian and non-custodial 
parent(s), applying ICWA when a guardianship is ambiguously defined by 
state law and the effects of failing to apply ICWA to guardianships.  Finally, in 
Part VI, a conclusion is drawn that courts and legislatures must become more 
assertive in developing explicit laws pertaining to ICWA guardianships to 
avoid frustrating the principles that drove Congress to pass the legislation. 
II.  THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ICWA 
A. The Policies Framed in ICWA 
It is essential to understand the motivation behind ICWA to become 
familiar with the provisions of the Act, especially those that appear to be 
unclear.  ICWA was enacted in 1978 to “protect the best interests of the Indian 
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and 
families . . . .”13  It was a part of a congressional “restitution policy”14 
instituted in the 1970s in response to Western civilization’s undermining of 
Native American political, economic and cultural practices over the previous 
hundred years.15  Indian law scholars explain that 
[f]ederal Indian policy has always dealt, at its nub, with the question of 
whether and to what extent the United States should permit, encourage, or 
force the assimilation of American Indians into the majority society . . . .  [A] 
prominent force behind assimilationist policy has been the desire for Indian 
land and resources.  But it is not that simple.  Many non-Indians, especially 
those unfamiliar with Indian people and Indian reservations, see life on the 
reservations as undesirable, as a blot on our national character.  To them, 
Indians themselves would benefit by leaving tribal life behind and sharing in 
the benefits offered by the majority society.16 
 
 13. 25 U.S.C. § 1902. 
 14. Alissa M. Wilson, The Best Interests of Children in the Cultural Context of the Indian 
Child Welfare Act in In Re S.S. and R.S., 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 839, 845 (1997). 
 15. Id. at 844-45. 
 16. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS 26 (3d ed. 
1998). 
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Ultimately, Congress determined that Native American traditions, values and 
customs were more important to preserve than was the assimilation of Native 
Americans into the dominant17 Anglo-Saxon lifestyle.18 
More specifically, this legislation was a response to the high rate of 
removal of Indian children from Indian homes and placement into non-Indian 
foster and adoptive homes and institutions.19  Because of cultural differences 
and biases and the dominating authority of state courts, Indian children were 
too easily removed from their Indian families and tribes altogether.  A survey 
of large Indian populations, conducted by the Association of American Indian 
Affairs, revealed that twenty-five to thirty-five percent of all Indian children 
were removed from their homes and placed into foster homes, adoptive homes 
or institutions.20  Eighty-five percent of those children placed in foster care 
were placed in non-Indian homes.21  In response to these concerns, Congress, 
through ICWA, established “minimum Federal standards for the removal of 
Indian children from their families and the placement of such children in foster 
or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian 
culture . . . .”22 
 
 17. Three decades after the introduction of restitution policy, one could quite easily argue 
that America is a much more diverse country nowadays and is much more accommodating to all 
cultures within its borders.  Thus, the use of the word “dominant” has lost a bit of its stinging 
resonance in this context. 
 18. B.J. JONES, THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT HANDBOOK—A LEGAL GUIDE TO 
CUSTODY AND ADOPTION OF NATIVE AMERICAN CHILDREN 4 (1995) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. 
 19. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4).  See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination Act, 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq. 
(1978). 
 20. David Woodward, The Rights of Reservation Parents and Children: Cultural Survival or 
the Final Termination?, in NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS 101-02 
(John R. Wunder ed., 1999) (citing 1 ASSOCIATION ON AMERICA INDIAN AFFAIRS, INC., INDIAN 
FAMILY DEFENSE 1 (1974)). 
 21. Woodward, supra note 20, at 102 (citing 1 ASSOCIATION ON AMERICA INDIAN AFFAIRS, 
INC., INDIAN FAMILY DEFENSE 2 (1974)).  Woodward provides a vivid example of the unethical, 
yet typical, pre-ICWA practices: 
On January 9, 1973, Delphine Foote, a 24-year-old mother from the Standing Rock Sioux 
Reservation, left her infant son, Christopher, with the South Dakota Welfare Department 
and her signature on a form which stated explicitly that relinquishment of custody was 
strictly temporary.  That statement was reinforced by the oral understanding between Ms. 
Foote and her assigned social worker that Christopher would be immediately returned 
upon demand.  The mother subsequently made that demand only to have the Department 
institute a neglect and dependency proceeding against her in an attempt to terminate her 
parental rights to Christopher and thereby facilitate his adoption by the non-Indian foster 
parents with whom he had been placed. 
Id. at 102 (citing Habeas Corpus Hearing, Mobridge, S.D. (Cir. Ct. 6th Jud. Dist., Apr. 1974)). 
 22. 25 U.S.C. § 1902.  “Congress has always felt a traditional interest in Indian affairs 
deriving from the authority given it in the Constitution ‘to regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.’”  WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, 
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One issue that arises is whether the best interests of the child is subservient 
to the best interest of the tribe.  Congress has identified both as vital,23 but 
problems arise when these two interests conflict.  The question, then, is 
whether one concern supercedes the other.  The text of the Act gives no 
guidance.  In these situations, it is probably most logical to apply a balancing 
test.  For instance, consider a situation where a non-Indian guardian has cared 
for an Indian child for an extended period of time.  Both of the biological 
parents have been nonexistent in the child’s life for years.  But one parent who 
is an alcoholic and has a history of child abuse and neglect initiates an action to 
regain possession of the child.  The court must balance the two purposes of the 
Act: is it more important to allow the child to develop within the Indian 
community despite the risk posed by the abusive parent, or should the child’s 
Indian heritage be ignored in order to ensure nurturing within a caring home?  
These decisions can go either way depending on the factual context of the case. 
B. The Best Interests of the Indian Child 
The traditional theory of the best interests of the child emphasizes that the 
psychological bonding between the child and adult is a very important 
consideration in determining a child’s best interest.24  This notion of the best 
interests of the child is threaded into practically all child custody statutes.25  
However, the concept of best interests in ICWA requires looking not only at 
the child’s psychological bond with a parent, custodian or guardian, but also 
considering “the rights of the Indian child as an Indian and the rights of the 
Indian community and tribe in retaining [its] children in its society.”26  ICWA 
expresses Congress’s belief that Native Americans have such unique child-
 
RED MAN’S LAND/WHITE MAN’S LAW: THE PAST AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE AMERICAN 
INDIAN 214 (2d ed. 1995) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). 
 23. 25 U.S.C. § 1902. 
 24. See, e.g., In re Kassandra H. v. Patricia F., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
 25. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (1994) (“‘The best interests of the child’ means all 
relevant factors to be considered and evaluated by the court including . . . the intimacy of the 
relationship between each parent and the child . . .” and “the interaction and interrelationship of 
the child with a parent or parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the 
child’s best interest . . . .”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-102 (2000) (“‘Best interests of the child’ 
means the physical, mental, psychological conditions and needs of the child and any other factor 
considered by the court to be relevant to the child.”); W. V. CODE § 48-11-102 (2000) (“The 
primary objective of this article is to serve the child’s best interest, by facilitating [inter alia] 
[c]ontinuity of existing parent-child attachments . . . .”); and MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.23 (2000) 
(“‘[B]est interests of the child’ means . . . [inter alia] [t]he love, affection, and other emotional 
ties existing between the parties involved and the child . . .” and “[t]he capacity and disposition of 
the parties involved to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education 
and raising of the child in his or her religion or creed, if any.”). 
 26. Hon. Maurice Portley, The Indian Child Welfare Act: A Primer, 36 ARIZ. ATT’Y 24, 25 
(2000) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1386 (1978)). 
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raising practices that state statutes are inadequate instruments for determining 
the best interests of an Indian child.27  The widespread removal of Native 
American children from their families had detrimental effects on Native 
American tribes, which depended upon the unity of their communities and 
traditions for their survival.28  Much weight must be given to the value of 
allowing the child to develop within the Indian community.  Congress’s theory 
is that the modified best interest standard can be utilized to arrive at desirable 
outcomes.29 
Native Americans rely heavily on survival of the “whole” to which they 
belong, which includes not only their immediate families, but also the 
communal tribe, the land on which they live and the wildlife that surrounds 
them.30  This style of living is impressed upon Indian children from birth 
through child-rearing traditions such as oral storytelling,31 which is a means of 
teaching rules on living and how to treat other people and animals.32  
Additionally, Indian children often have responsibilities that extend beyond 
 
 27. HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 5. 
 28. Id. 
 29. These outcomes include a reduction in the rate of Indian children placed outside the 
tribal home and an increase in tribal participation in the judicial process.  The Supreme Court 
decision in Palmore v. Sidoti also brings about important considerations with regard to Indian 
children’s best interests. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).  There, the Court ruled that courts may not 
consider race as the sole factor in determining the best interests.  Id. at 434.  The scope of this 
landmark decision is unclear.  Perhaps the decision extends to ethnicity.  Further, perhaps race or 
ethnicity may be considered as one factor among many.  Two points should be noted: First, the 
party asserting that race should be considered in Palmore may have been concerned that suffering 
would be sure to come in the future.  That is, because the child was not part of a racially aligned 
family, that child might experience emotional and psychological problems in the future.  With its 
decision, the Court did not accept this line of reasoning, which seems to contravene the special 
standard for determining an Indian child’s best interest.  But see text accompanying notes 35-39.  
Second, the Palmore decision suggests that child custody considerations should be hierarchically 
arranged—that is, maybe the Palmore Court sacrificed the child’s best interest because 
preventing racial discrimination was a higher constitutional priority for the Court.  If this is the 
case, maybe ICWA should be construed as a hierarchical arrangement between the Indian child’s 
interest and the preservation of Indian heritage—the Court has always given special protection to 
the Indian tribe, so it may be more of a priority than the Indian child’s best interests.  See text 
accompanying notes 35-39. 
 30. HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 5 (citing JOHN F. BRYDE, MODERN INDIAN PSYCHOLOGY 
(1971)). 
 31. Id. (citing MICHAEL J. CADUTO & JOSEPH BRUCHAC, KEEPERS OF THE ANIMALS: 
NATIVE AMERICAN STORIES AND WILDLIFE ACTIVITIES FOR CHILDREN (1991)). 
 32. Id. (citing THOMAS MAILS, FOOLS CROW: WISDOM AND POWER (1991)).  Oral 
storytelling is also a tradition in many other cultures.  However, when comparing Native 
American oral storytelling traditions to that of the Anglo-Saxon society, it is apparent that 
storytelling is a much more prevalent and deliberate tool for child rearing in the Native American 
culture. 
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their nuclear family.33  This is considerably different from the formal education 
process and practices of the typical immediate family in the Anglo-Saxon 
culture.  These fundamental differences in values and methods of child-rearing 
provided Congress with the justification to develop a different standard for 
determining the placement of Indian children within or outside the Indian 
home.34 
C. Challenges to the Constitutionality of ICWA 
The different best interests standard, as well as other provisions of ICWA, 
has repeatedly withstood constitutional challenges.35  The United States 
Supreme Court has recognized that there is a special relationship between the 
federal government and Indian tribes.  The government’s responsibilities have 
been characterized as being similar to a guardian in a trust relationship.36  
Congress has an enumerated power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes.37  
Courts recognized even before the enactment of ICWA that tribal courts had 
jurisdiction in domestic relations problems, including marriages, adoptions, 
divorces, property distributions and determination of children’s rights, so long 
as the parties resided on the reservation.38  In the past, however, state law 
usually applied to Indians in these same cases if they ventured off the 
reservation; they were no longer under the jurisdiction of the reservation tribal 
courts.39  Today, this is not the case as Congress has dictated a broader scope 
for tribal court jurisdiction. 
 
 33. Id. (citing ELLA CARA DELORIA, WATERLILY (1988) (detailing a Dakota woman’s life 
from birth to old age)). 
 34. See HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 6.  But see David Null, In re Junious M.: The 
California Application of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 8 J. JUV. L. 74, 86 (1984) (“The . . . Act 
was promulgated for all the right reasons.  The Act is flawed, however, because it failed to 
consider that many children are, in fact, of multiracial backgrounds with little identity or heritage 
as Indians to protect.”). 
 35. See, e.g., In re Appeal of Pima County Juvenile Action S-903, 635 P.2d 187 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).  Also note that the Palmore Court did not 
address ICWA, so even after 1984, ICWA has remained intact.  See supra note 29. 
 36. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); United States v. Mitchell, 463 
U.S. 206 (1980). 
 37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 38. HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 7 (citing Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) 
(discussing exclusive authority to grant on-reservation adoption)); NoFire v. United States, 164 
U.S. 657 (1897) (discussing authority to grant marriage license); Conroy v. Conroy, 575 F.2d 175 
(8th Cir. 1978) (discussing authority to divide marital property); Carney v. Chapman, 247 U.S. 
102 (1918); Heart v. Ellenbecker, 689 F. Supp. 989 (D.S.D. 1988). 
 39. Id. (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973)). 
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D. Achieving Its Purpose 
ICWA has alleviated some of the problems Congress intended to address 
with its enactment.  Its mere existence naturally forces judicial recognition of 
Native American concerns.  The rapidly increasing number of ICWA cases is 
evidence that courts have involved tribes, tribal courts and other Indian parties 
more frequently than before enactment.  Consequently, the rate of removal 
from Indian homes has been reduced over the last two decades.40  However, 
removal of Indian children from their Indian homes seems to be 
disproportionately high compared with removal of non-Indian children from 
their ethnic or racial homes.41  Nevertheless, ICWA appears to be legislation 
that has the ultimate capability of ensuring the survival of Indian tribes, while 
providing a proper environment for the nurturing of Indian children, at least in 
most cases.  The key to achieving this end is providing courts with awareness 
of the broad scope of the Act’s application.  As with any statute, there exists a 
problem interpreting Congress’s intent.  Hence, educating courts on situations 
that require the applicability of ICWA becomes imperative to promote 
uniformity. 
The two-fold purpose of the Act is “to protect the best interests of Indian 
children and promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and 
families . . . .”42  These motivations for the legislation were based on 
congressional findings and must be considered while interpreting every 
provision in the Act to determine how courts should apply it.43 
III.  APPLICATION OF ICWA: HOW DOES IT WORK? 
An analysis of any aspect of ICWA requires an understanding of how the 
Act operates to achieve its stated objectives.  Before delving into the 
guardianship issues, it is essential to discuss the scope and jurisdictional 
underpinnings of the Act.  Generally, these underpinnings are geared toward 
promoting active Indian party and tribal court participation.  Nevertheless, 
these legitimate means of carrying out the objectives of Congress do not 
entirely eliminate the tendency of overwhelming placement of Indian children 
in non-Indian homes by state courts. 
 
 40. See Wahl, supra note 7, at 836. 
 41. See id. at 836 n.151.  Wahl points out, for example, that “Indian children in Minnesota 
continue to be removed from their homes ten times more frequently than Caucasian children.”  Id. 
at 836.  Similarly, “Indian children represent less than one percent of the children in Minnesota, 
but comprise nearly twelve percent of the state’s out-of-home placements.”  Id. 
 42. 25 U.S.C. § 1902; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 43. Wilson, supra note 14, at 847-48 n.69. 
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A. Distinguishing Proceedings Covered and Not Covered by ICWA 
The Act only applies to “child custody proceedings.”  It defines four types: 
(1) “foster care placement” which means “any action removing an Indian child 
from its parent or Indian custodian for temporary placement in a foster home or 
institution or the home of a guardian or conservator where the parent or Indian 
custodian cannot have the child returned upon demand, but where parental 
rights have not been terminated”; (2) “termination of parental rights” which 
means “any action resulting in the termination of the parent-child 
relationship”; (3) “pre-adoptive placement” which means “the temporary 
placement of an Indian child in a foster home or institution after the 
termination of parental rights, but prior to or in lieu of adoptive placement”; 
and (4) “adoptive placement” which means the permanent placement of an 
Indian child for adoption, including any action resulting in a final decree of 
adoption.”44 
Once the court determines whether the proceeding is a child custody 
proceeding, the next question to answer is whether the child is an Indian.45  As 
defined by the Act, an “Indian child” is “any unmarried person who is either a 
member of an Indian tribe or is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and 
is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”46  The tribe must be 
federally recognized for a child to be eligible.47  Typically, courts leave it to 
the relevant tribe to declare that the child is either a member or eligible for 
membership in the tribe.48 Any decision made by the tribe pertaining to 
membership or eligibility is given full faith and credit.49  Once the child is 
deemed an Indian and the proceeding falls within ICWA, the court must 
conclude that ICWA applies. 
The latitude given tribes to make membership and eligibility decisions is 
clearly a deliberate attempt by Congress to increase tribal participation, and 
undoubtedly an intention to decrease the removal of children from Native 
American tribes.50  It is not an objective practice by any means.  These 
decisions are usually based on the composition of Indian blood in the 
individual, and the blood requirements can vary greatly from tribe to tribe.51  If 
a proceeding reaches this stage, where the tribe must determine membership or 
 
 44. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1). 
 45. Portley, supra note 26, at 25.  See also generally, HANDBOOK, supra note 18. 
 46. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). 
 47. The Secretary of Interior publishes annually a list of Indian tribes eligible for federal 
services and programs.  It is rare to be deemed an eligible Indian tribe, but not be recognized on 
the list.  See, e.g., Interest of C.H., 510 N.W.2d 119 (S.D. 1993). 
 48. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).  This means a state court is pre-
empted from determining membership. 
 49. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d). 
 50. Wahl, supra note 7, at 811-32. 
 51. Id. at 831-32. 
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eligibility, in theory, state courts have no discretion as to whether the Act 
applies; the decision is left to the tribe and hinges on whether the tribe finds 
that the child is an Indian.52 
However, even when a child is deemed an Indian, there are instances 
where the proceeding is not covered by ICWA.  The Act does not apply to 
custody disputes between the two natural parents.53  Another important type of 
proceeding not covered under ICWA is delinquency placements.  These are 
placement proceedings involving  “act[s] which, if committed by an adult 
would be deemed a crime . . . .”54 
A third exception to ICWA application is a judicially created minority 
position that is inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court holding in 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, the most famous ICWA 
case since the Act’s inception.55  In Holyfield, the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that the state court did not have jurisdiction over a child custody 
proceeding involving a reservation-domiciled Native American couple who 
placed their twins with a non-Native American family residing off the 
reservation for adoption.56  This reversed the Mississippi Supreme Court’s 
holding that ICWA did not apply in the adoption case because the Indian 
children had never resided with a Native American family and were not 
domiciled on the reservation.  The United States Supreme Court sent a strong 
message to state courts that, even where parents voluntarily give up their 
children, ICWA can still apply.  Thus, in Holyfield, the Choctaw Tribe had the 
right to be put on notice of the action.57  Furthermore, the tribal court had the 
right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction.58  The Court reasoned that it was not a 
question of outcome, but rather a question of who should decide the outcome.59  
This rationale suggests that tribal court involvement is of utmost importance.  
In spite of the Supreme Court’s ruling, state court decisions in Washington,60 
 
 52. Portley, supra note 26, at 25. 
 53. In re Sengstock, 477 N.W.2d 717 (S.D. 1989); Malatarre v. Malatarre, 293 N.W.2d 139 
(N.D. 1980); In re Baisley, 749 P.2d 446 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987). 
 54. 25 U.S.C. 1903(1).  See, e.g., T.D.C, 748 P.2d 201, 203 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (rejecting 
application of ICWA to placement of an Indian child for the commission of criminal conduct 
even though conduct was not serious under 42 U.S.C. § 5603(14) (1994)).  However, note that 
“[t]here are several exceptions to this general rule, many of which are discussed in the guidelines 
enacted by the Department of Interior to guide state courts in the implementation of ICWA.”  
HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 14.  See Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs 
Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584 (Nov. 26, 
1979). 
 55. 490 U.S. 30 (1989). 
 56. Id. at 40-41. 
 57. Id. at 53-54. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 53. 
 60. In re Crews, 825 P.2d 305 (Wash. 1992). 
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Oklahoma,61 Alabama62 and Louisiana63 have held that this exception still 
exists.  While some of these courts made attempts at distinguishing Holyfield, 
these decisions reflect ignorance of or, perhaps more accurately, disdain for 
federal law.64 
Finally, most importantly as it relates to guardianships, a fourth proceeding 
not covered by ICWA is placement of a child where the parent can regain 
custody of the child upon demand.65  The definition of “foster care placement” 
is limited.  The only kind of guardianship covered by the Act is one where the 
child cannot be returned upon demand; it is a subset of foster care 
placements.66  If the parent can regain possession of the child upon demand, 
then ICWA is inapplicable.67  Situations where the parent can demand the child 
be returned are often voluntary.  This voluntary parental right can be revoked 
rather easily.  This voluntary placement occurs frequently due to the 
educational and religious needs of the child.68  It should not be confused with 
the voluntary placement for purposes of an adoption, which ICWA clearly 
governs.69 
 
 61. In re S.C., 833 P.2d 1249 (Okla. 1992). 
 62. S.A. v. E.J.P., 571 So. 2d 1187 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990). 
 63. Barbry v. Dauzat, 576 So. 2d 1013 (La. Ct. App. 1991). 
 64. See C.E.H. v. L.M.W., 837 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).  Jones points out that the 
appeals court “also suggested in rather strong dicta that the existing family exception is 
doctrinally correct, although the court there went on to apply the act.”  HANDBOOK, supra note 
18, at 25 n.26.  See supra text accompanying notes 4, 11. 
 65. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  This is implied from the text of the Act: foster care placement means “any action 
removing an Indian child from its parent or Indian custodian for temporary placement in a foster 
home or institution or the home of a guardian or conservator where the parent or Indian 
custodian cannot have the child returned upon demand, but where parental rights have not been 
terminated.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 68. Jones notes: 
One reason there has been a high incidence of “voluntary” placements of Indian children 
for education purposes has been the failure of the Bureau of Indian Affairs to construct 
schools that are in close proximity to many Indian population bases.  In the 1984 
Oversight Hearings on the Indian Child Welfare Act, the Association on American Indian 
Affairs cited BIA statistics showing that almost one out of every two Indian students in 
the BIA education system had to be placed at a boarding school because of the absence of 
local day schools.  This, as Congress noted at Title IV of ICWA, 25 U.S.C. § 1961(a), 
contributed to the displacement problems that ICWA was enacted to address.  This 
problem has been somewhat alleviated by new standards for BIA schools.  See 25 U.S.C. 
§ 2001e, which stresses the need for local day schools. 
HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 24 n.13. 
 69. See 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a).  See also HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 24 n.14: 
The Department of Interior has promulgated recent amendments to 25 C.F.R. § 23.1 et 
seq., in which the department defines “child custody proceeding” to also include “other 
tribal placements made in accordance with the placement preferences of the Act, 
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B. Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction is at the very heart of ICWA.70  Congress intended to give 
tribal courts jurisdiction whenever possible because of their superior 
knowledge of Indian child-rearing practices, traditions and customs.71  It falls 
squarely in line with the purposes of the Act: to preserve Indian heritage and to 
determine the child’s best interests using the unique standard.72  Tribal courts 
have exclusive jurisdiction over “any custody proceeding involving an Indian 
child who resides or is domiciled73 within the reservation of such tribe, except 
where such jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the State by existing Federal 
law.”74  They also have exclusive jurisdiction “[w]here an Indian child is a 
ward of a tribal court . . . notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the 
child.”75  When the tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction, the state court is 
entirely removed from the case and cannot exercise any decision-making 
authority. 
If the Indian child is not domiciled within an Indian reservation or is not a 
ward of the tribal court, there is still a presumption of tribal jurisdiction.76  A 
case should be transferred to the tribal court unless there has been an express 
rejection of jurisdiction by the tribal court, an objection by either parent to the 
transfer or good cause is shown not to make the transfer.77  Furthermore, the 
tribe can intervene at any time in the proceeding to protect its interests.78 
 
including the temporary or permanent placement of an Indian child in accordance with 
tribal children’s codes and local tribal customs or traditions.”  59 Fed. Reg. 2,257 
(January 13, 1994).  The import of this amendment is unclear. 
Id. 
 70. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989). 
 71. HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 29. 
 72. See supra notes 13, 42 and accompanying text. 
 73. The Holyfield Court established that a child’s domicile is the same as his or her parents’ 
and an illegitimate child’s domicile is the same as his or her mother’s.  Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 48. 
 74. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 36 (interpreting 25 U.S.C. § 1911). 
 77. In re A.P., 961 P.2d 706, 712 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998). 
ICWA does not define “good cause.”  Courts have followed the criteria adopted by the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs.  Good cause exists (1) if the Indian child’s tribe does not have a 
tribal court as defined by the act; (2) if the proceeding was at an advanced stage when the 
petition to transfer was filed and the petitioner did not file promptly after receiving notice 
of the hearing; (3) if the Indian child is older than 12 years of age and objects to the 
transfer; (4) if the tribal court would be an inconvenient forum to the parties or the 
witnesses; and (5) if the parents of a child older than five years of age are not available 
and the child has had little or no contact with the child’s tribe or its members. 
Id.; see 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b); 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584 (Nov. 26, 1979). 
 78. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c). 
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C. The Notice Requirement 
There are a number of procedural mandates to follow once it is determined 
that ICWA governs.  Depending on whether the proceeding is voluntary or 
involuntary, certain provisions require different procedures.  All requirements 
are intended to establish a high level of protection for parents and tribes from 
states’ abilities to remove a child from the home and from the Indian tribe. 
One such mandate is the notice requirement for involuntary proceedings.  
Congress’s notion was that “a child’s Indian tribe has a discrete interest, 
separate from a parent’s or Indian custodian’s, in any proceeding involving the 
child that must be protected throughout.”79  Notice must be given to parents, or 
the Secretary of the Interior if the parents’ location is unknown, and to the 
relevant tribe(s).80  This requirement is extremely important.  Without proper 
notice the underlying principles of the Act are frustrated because none of the 
Indian parties enter the action to protect the tribal interests and the child’s 
interests as it relates to his or her Indian heritage. 
D. Placement of Indian Children in Foster Care and Through Adoption 
The goal of Congress was to place Indian children “in foster or adoptive 
homes which would reflect the unique values of Indian culture . . . .”81  The 
Supreme Court stated in Holyfield that the placement preferences expressed in 
§ 1915(a) of the Act are “[t]he most important substantive requirements 
imposed on state courts . . . .”82  Absent good cause,83 when placing a child in a 
foster home, the child must be placed with 
(i) a member of the Indian child’s extended family; (ii) a foster home licensed, 
approved or specified by the Indian child’s tribe; (iii) an Indian foster home 
licensed or approved by an authorized non-Indian licensing authority; or (iv) 
an institution for children approved by the Indian tribe or operated by an 
Indian organization which has a program suitable to meet the Indian child’s 
needs.84 
ICWA also requires that, absent good cause, Indian children placed for 
adoption must be placed with “(1) a member of the child’s extended family; (2) 
 
 79. HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 51 (citing Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 49). 
 80. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a). 
 81. Id. § 1902. 
 82. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 31. 
 83. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.  The significance of giving a child discretion 
to determine jurisdiction on the condition that she reaches a certain age (the age of 12 if referring 
to the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ good cause definition) is important.  It diminishes the chances of 
finding tribal court jurisdiction.  It allows room for a “mature” Indian child to make a decision 
which Congress implicitly expresses would be in the best interests of the child.  This is a very 
rare instance where an Indian party may side with the non-Indian party. 
 84. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b). 
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other members of the Indian child’s tribe; or (3) other Indian families.”85  
Clearly, these preferences show that Congress intended to allow all reasonable 
alternatives to keep the Indian child within the tribe whenever it was 
impossible to maintain the child’s ties with his or her parents.86 
IV.  THE CASE OF GUARDIANSHIPS 
A. Identifying the ICWA Guardianship 
Section 1911 of the Act establishes exclusive jurisdiction for “[a]n Indian 
tribe . . . over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child who 
resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe . . . .”87  
Furthermore, “[w]here an Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, the Indian 
tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or 
domicile of the child.”88  A careful examination of the definitions provides 
insight as to when these provisions necessitate application of the Act.  A child 
custody proceeding includes foster care placement.  Foster care placement 
includes an action “removing an Indian child from its parent or Indian 
custodian for temporary placement in a foster home or institution or the home 
of a guardian or conservator where the parent or Indian custodian cannot 
have the child returned upon demand, but where parental rights have not been 
terminated.”89  In other words, state courts must be aware that ICWA applies to 
a substantial amount of guardianships, and guardianships, ultimately, are a 
subset of foster care placements. 
B. Misconstruing ICWA as It Applies to Foster Care Placements 
Even if a court recognizes that some, but not all, guardianships are covered 
by ICWA, thereby successfully avoiding a missed opportunity to apply the 
Act, potential for misconstruing the Act as it pertains to foster care placements, 
specifically guardianships, remains a concern.  The language of § 1913(b) of 
the Act, which states, “[a]ny parent or Indian custodian may withdraw consent 
to a foster care placement under State law at any time and, upon such 
withdrawal, the child shall be returned to the parent or Indian custodian,”90 
 
 85. Id. § 1915(a). 
 86. HANDBOOK, supra note 18, at 84. While these are legitimate means of carrying out the 
objectives of Congress, many states continue to overwhelmingly place Indian children in non-
Indian homes, a problem the construction of the scope and jurisdictional requirements were 
intended to eliminate.  Id.  Jones points out that this does not necessarily reflect ignorance of 
ICWA, but may more likely be a result of difficulties arising in recruiting Indian foster homes, 
especially in urban areas with small Indian populations.  Id. 
 87. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (emphasis added). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. § 1903(1)(i) (emphasis added). 
 90. Id. § 1913(b) (emphasis added). 
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seems to contradict the meaning of foster care placement.91  Reciting an 
excerpt from the trial court’s decision, the appellate court in In re K.L.R.F. 
stated in its opinion, “[§ 1913(b)] provides that consent can be withdrawn at 
any time with regard to a foster care placement; and [§ 1903(1)(i)] just as 
explicitly states that in a foster care placement, the parent or Indian custodian 
cannot have the child returned upon demand.”92  Further, the trial court noted 
that “if § 1903 is in fact what the legislature intended the definition of ‘foster 
care placement’ to be, then § 1913(b) can be given no effect because a foster 
care placement by definition precludes the possibility of a parent being entitled 
to the return of the child upon demand.”93 
The court in In re K.L.R.F. construed § 1913(b) to apply to situations 
where a “consensual foster care placement [is] made in the first place and there 
is no inherent bar to a withdrawal of the consent.”94  The court enumerated 
three principles behind this decision.  First, “the drafters of the statute did not 
intend a result that is absurd or impossible of execution.”95  Second, “the 
drafters did intend the entire statute to be effective and certain.”96  Finally, 
“statutes enacted to benefit American Indians must be liberally construed with 
all doubts resolved in favor of the Indian seeking its benefits or protections.”97  
Thus, the provisions interact in such a way that they do not nullify each 
other.98 
The Federal Register, which provides guidelines to help clarify ICWA, 
states that “[v]oluntary placements which do not operate to prohibit the child’s 
parent . . . from regaining custody of the child at any time are not covered by 
the Act.”99  The Alaska Supreme Court has explained that the 
[c]ommentary to guideline B.3, which explains the reasons for creating this 
exception, specifically refers to [formal written agreements between private 
groups or states and parents for temporary custody] and stresses how such 
agreements are to be structured so that ICWA will not apply to them . . . .  The 
guidelines recommend that the parties to such agreements explicitly provide 
for return of the child upon demand if they do not wish the Act to apply to such 
placements.  Inclusion of such a provision is advisable because courts 
frequently assume that when an agreement is reduced to writing, the parties 
have only those rights specifically written into the agreement.100 
 
 91. See supra text accompanying note 89. 
 92. 515 A.2d 33, 36-37 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). 
 93. Id. at 37. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. In re K.L.R.F., 515 A.2d at 37. 
 98. Id. 
 99. 44 Fed. Reg. 67,587 (Nov. 26, 1979). 
 100. D.E.D. v. Alaska, 704 P.2d 774, 781-82 (Alaska 1985). 
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The Alaska Supreme Court, in D.E.D v. Alaska, determined that a voluntary 
care agreement entered into by the biological mother with a family and youth 
services organization, which allowed the state to provide temporary foster care 
for the minor child, did not fall into ICWA’s definition of foster care 
placement since the child could be returned to the mother “at any time.”101  
This explanation by the Alaska Supreme Court, accompanied with the 
guidelines set forth by the Federal Register, reveals that, if a court is faced with 
the situation of a guardianship where the child can be returned upon demand, it 
is not a child custody proceeding, and ICWA does not apply.  However, § 1913 
only becomes relevant after determining that the requirements of § 1903 have 
not been satisfied.  As the D.E.D. court explained, if the agreement fulfills the 
suggestions by the guidelines for voluntary placement, that is, the parent 
understands the terms, her intention is to use it for a short time (a few days 
perhaps) and it is signed, ICWA is inapplicable.  Thus, it does not have to 
satisfy the requirements of § 1913.102 
C. Case Illustrations of ICWA Guardianship Identification 
Since the legislation’s inception in 1978, few courts have invoked ICWA 
on account of the involvement of a guardianship proceeding of an Indian child.  
Since the purpose of this legislative Note is to increase judicial awareness, it is 
instructive to consider some of these ICWA guardianship cases.  Elaborating 
on some of these cases may be useful in improving identification of ICWA 
guardianships. 
1. Grandparents as “Guardians” 
In re A.K.H. involved a grandmother who successfully sought sole physical 
and legal custody of the Indian child with visitation rights to the parents whose 
parental rights were not terminated.103  While the parents were granted limited 
rights, the nature of the guardianship did not allow for the return of the child 
upon demand.104  The appellate court faced the issue of whether the Indian 
tribe had a statutory right to intervene in the district court proceeding under 
ICWA.105  The court had to first determine whether the proceeding involved a 
foster care placement.106  The court considered the four prongs of ICWA foster 
care placement: “(1) removing the Indian child from the child’s parent or 
Indian custodian; (2) temporarily placing the child in a ‘foster home or 
institution or the home of a guardian or conservator’ where; (3) the parent or 
 
 101. Id. at 777, 781. 
 102. Id. at 782. 
 103. In re A.K.H., 502 N.W.2d 790, 792 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c)). 
 106. Id. at 792. 
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Indian custodian cannot have the child returned upon demand; and (4) parental 
rights have not been terminated.”107  Concluding that prongs one, three and 
four had been met, the focus of the court’s opinion was on prong two.108 
In beginning its analysis, the Minnesota court referred to state statutes.  
“Foster care” is defined under Minnesota statute as: 
the 24 hour a day care of a child in any facility which for gain or otherwise 
regularly provides one or more children, when unaccompanied by their 
parents, with substitute for the care, food, lodging, training, education, 
supervision or treatment they need but which for any reason cannot be 
furnished by their parents or legal guardians in their homes.109 
The court did not believe the grandmother’s home qualified as a foster 
home based on this definition, so it focused its attention on the possibility of 
guardianship status.110  Because the term “guardian” is not defined under the 
Act, the court used the Minnesota statutory definition.  A guardian of a minor 
“has the powers and responsibilities of a parent . . . .”111  A guardian can 
“facilitate the ward’s education, social and other activities and authorize 
medical care.”112  The court determined that these powers would be granted to 
the grandmother if she were awarded custody.  Thus, the proceeding 
encompassed the term guardian under ICWA, and ICWA applied.113 
2. Temporary Placement as “Foster Care Placement” 
A Washington appellate court faced the same issue in defining guardian 
with no guidance from the Act.114  There, the Indian tribe sought to vacate an 
order awarding permanent custody of an Indian child to his natural mother’s 
parents because the tribe had neither been notified of nor appeared at the 
custody hearing.115  Neither party disputed that it was an involuntary 
proceeding and the child was an Indian.  The child, S.B.R., was removed from 
the father for temporary placement, as opposed to a permanent adoptive 
placement,116 and was put in the custody of the grandparents.  Instead of 
looking to state statutory law defining guardian, the court simply relied on 
dictionary definitions.  It concluded that the rights acquired by the 
 
 107. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i)). 
 108. A.K.H., 502 N.W.2d at 792. 
 109. Id. at 792-93 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 260.015 (1994)). 
 110. Id. at 793. 
 111. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 525.619 (1994)). 
 112. Id. at 793. 
 113. A.K.H., 502 N.W.2d at 793. 
 114. In re S.B.R., 719 P.2d 154, 156 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986). 
 115. Id. at 155 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c)). 
 116. Id. at 156 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(iv)). 
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grandparents qualified as ICWA guardianship rights under any definition.117  
Since the father could not have the child returned upon demand, but could only 
seek to modify the child custody decree,118 this was a foster care placement 
proceeding contemplated by ICWA.119 
3. Maternal Relatives as “Indian Custodians” 
On appeal in state court, the Navajo Nation Indian tribe, in In re Ashley 
Elizabeth R.,120 contested the “good cause” finding by the district court.121  
However, the interesting issue the lower court faced, as it pertains to ICWA 
guardianships, was whether the two Indian children in the case were 
transferred by a “parent or Indian custodian.”122  This is another technicality of 
the foster care placement definition that cannot be overlooked.  The two 
children were not living with their parents at the time of the guardianship 
proceeding.123  Instead, they were under the custody of their paternal great-
aunt.124  The tribe successfully argued that this aunt constituted an Indian 
custodian.125  An Indian custodian is “any Indian person who has legal custody 
of an Indian child under tribal law or custom or under State law or to whom 
temporary physical care, custody, and control has been transferred by the 
parent of such child.”126  Based on a tribal social worker’s testimony, the court 
determined that Navajo tradition dictated that custody of orphaned children is 
vested within the mother’s family.127  This usually meant the maternal 
grandmother was awarded custody.128  If the grandmother was not alive, as in 
this case, then a maternal aunt was sufficient to satisfy the Indian custodian 
requirement.129  Thus, fulfilling all other requirements of the foster care 
placement definition, ICWA was applicable in the guardianship proceeding.130 
4. The Proper Incorporation of State Law 
The aforementioned cases all involve Indian children and guardianships.  
However, it is also instructive to look at a procedurally complex case that does 
 
 117. Id.; see also WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 599 (3d ed. 1988); BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 712 (7th ed. 1999). 
 118. S.B.R., 719 P.2d at 156 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.260 (1985)). 
 119. Id. 
 120. 863 P.2d 451 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). 
 121. See supra note 77. 
 122. Ashley Elizabeth R., 863 P.2d at 453 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i)). 
 123. Id. at 452. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 453. 
 126. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1903(6)). 
 127. Ashley Elizabeth R., 863 P.2d at 453. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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not involve an Indian child.  Stevens v. Redwing,131 a case decided by the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, presents the exact fact pattern that gives rise 
to the guardianship dilemma, and thus is a useful tool for understanding the 
overlooked issues with ICWA guardianships.  The plaintiff, Stevens, was 
serving a prison sentence with the Missouri Department of Corrections for 
second degree murder.132  While on parole he married and his daughter, Jami 
Lynn, was born in 1990.133  The plaintiff’s wife died shortly thereafter in a car 
accident.134  Stevens returned to prison after a parole violation, and the child’s 
maternal grandparents, the Sanders, began caring for Jami Lynn.135  In 1993, 
Stevens consented to the appointment of the grandparents as guardians and 
conservators for his daughter.136  The plaintiff filed a formal consent with the 
probate division of the Circuit Court of Stone County, Missouri, which stated, 
“I understand that I shall not have any right or claim to control or custody of 
such child . . . .”137 
In March of 1993, the child’s maternal aunt, defendant Redwing, came 
from her home in Georgia to take Jami Lynn back to live with her and her 
husband with the consent of the guardians and conservators.138  The Redwings 
sought permanent custody of Jami Lynn through the Georgia state juvenile 
court.139  Without approval of the Missouri probate court, the Sanders 
consented to the change in custody in the Georgia proceeding.140  Ultimately, 
the Georgia court awarded the Redwings permanent custody of Jami Lynn.141 
The Sanders then petitioned the Missouri court to terminate their 
guardianship due to their health problems.142  The court denied multiple 
motions and written objections that Stevens filed in that court.143  Eventually, 
the court terminated the grandparents’ guardianship of Jami Lynn and forfeited 
 
 131. 146 F.3d 538 (8th Cir. 1998).  Because this was a diversity suit, the action was in federal 
court, but Missouri law applied. 
 132. Id. at 541. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 541-42. 
 135. Id. at 542. 
 136. Stevens, 146 F.3d at 542.  It is worth noting that Stevens is distinguished from the 
scenario in D.E.D. because, although there was a consensual, or voluntary agreement in Stevens, 
no provision indicated that the child could be returned upon demand.  In fact, it was quite the 
opposite, wherein the father consented to relinquish all rights to the child.  Thus, it did “operate to 
prohibit the child’s parent . . . from regaining custody of the child at any time.” See supra text 
accompanying notes 99-102. 
 137. Stevens, 146 F.3d at 542. 
 138. Id. (grandparents consented because both were ill). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Stevens, 146 F.3d at 542. 
 143. Id. 
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jurisdiction to the state of Georgia.144  Stevens filed a notice of appeal with the 
probate court; however, the appeal was never processed.145 
In January 1995, the Redwings filed a petition in Georgia to terminate 
Stevens’ parental rights alleging sexual abuse of the minor child.146  While that 
action was still pending, Stevens filed suit in federal court seeking money 
damages for various torts.147  In his complaint he named the Redwings as 
defendants and, among other claims, alleged conspiracy to interfere with his 
custody rights.  The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss all 
claims for lack of personal jurisdiction.  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit 
considered the causes of action raised by Stevens. 
On the issue of whether the Redwings conspired to interfere with Stevens’s 
custody of Jami Lynn, the court held that Stevens had no custody right in the 
state of Missouri that would give defendants an opportunity to interfere.148  In 
Missouri, interference with custody may only be asserted by one who has 
custody rights.149  The court emphasized that Stevens had consented to 
appointment of the grandparents and even acknowledged he no longer had 
“any right or claim to control or custody of such child.”150  Furthermore, he 
understood “that the appointment [was] permanent and [would] not be set aside 
merely at [his] request.”151 
The court then considered the Missouri statutory law dealing with the 
rights of a guardian.  A Missouri statute provides that “[t]he guardian of the 
person of a minor shall be entitled to the custody and control of the 
ward . . . .”152 In other words, the statute specifies the order of authority 
between a guardian and the non-guardian parent.  The guardian has the 
ultimate right to make decisions for the child, while the parent has lost these 
custodial and controlling rights.  Although Stevens voluntarily surrendered 
physical custody of Jami Lynn and parental rights had not been terminated, the 
formal consent relinquishing all his legal custody rights, combined with the 
rights of a guardian established by Missouri statutory law, did not allow for the 
return of the child upon Stevens’s demand.153 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Stevens, 146 F.3d at 542. The tort claims included “conspiracy to interfere with his 
custody rights, conspiracy to interfere with a contract, conspiracy to harbor a child, conspiracy to 
alienate the affections of his daughter, defamation, malicious prosecution, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.”  Id. 
 148. Id. at 544. 
 149. Id. (citing Politte v. Politte, 727 S.W.2d 198, 199-200 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. MO. REV. STAT. § 475.120 (2000). 
 153. Stevens, 146 F.3d at 544. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2002] THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978 233 
V.  ANALYSIS OF ICWA GUARDIANSHIPS 
A. Missing the Opportunity 
To answer whether courts miss the opportunity to apply ICWA in 
guardianship proceedings, the first question that must be asked is whether 
courts even identify guardianships as potential triggers for ICWA application.  
Evidence suggests that some do not.  As witnessed in some proceedings 
involving Indian children and guardianships, it is apparent that there is not a 
clear understanding or awareness of the notion that some guardianships are 
governed by ICWA.  For example, the decision by the Montana Supreme 
Court in In re Bertelson154 clearly shows that guardianship proceedings, which 
call for Indian tribal jurisdiction, are not always identified. 
Bertelson concerned a custody dispute between the natural mother and 
grandparents of an Indian child.  The Bertelson court categorized the conflict 
as “an internal family dispute”155 and held that ICWA was not intended to 
cover such proceedings.156  Rather, the Act was intended to “preserve Indian 
culture values under circumstances in which an Indian child is placed in a 
foster home or other protective institution.”157  The Bertelson decision suggests 
that judges and attorneys believe ICWA only applies when a state, rather than 
a private party, is seeking placement out of the home.  This is a minority 
position, but one that is followed by a number of state and federal courts.158  
There is, however, no explicit language in the Act which makes such a 
distinction between a public and private party seeking involuntary 
placement.159 
The confused issue of identifying ICWA guardianship proceedings signals 
danger because, once the opportunity to apply the Act is overlooked, state law 
 
 154. 617 P.2d 121 (Mont. 1980). 
 155. Id. at 126. 
 156. See id. at 125. 
 157. Id. 
 158. See, e.g., R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979, 985 (9th Cir. 
1983) (requiring, for the invocation of federal jurisdiction, that the dispute arise from substantial 
activities outside the reservation); Comanche Indian Tribe v. Hovis, 847 F. Supp. 871, 876 n.4 
(W.D. Okla. 1994) (recognizing the split among courts as to ICWA application to intra-family 
disputes); In re Baisley, 749 P.2d 446, 449 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); In re A.K.H., 502 N.W.2d 790, 
794 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (recognizing, but declining to follow, the minority view); Desjarlait v. 
Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139, 142 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that states may have no authority 
over internal affairs of the reservation unless state jurisdiction is voluntarily invoked by those 
within); In re C.W., 479 N.W.2d 105, 112-13 (Neb. 1992); In re Skillen, 956 P.2d 1, 18-19 
(Mont. 1998); State v. Horseman, 866 P.2d 1110, 1114-15 (Mont. 1993); In re Zier, 750 P.2d 
1083, 1084 (Mont. 1988). 
 159. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (defining “child custody proceeding”); see also A.B.M. v. 
M.H., 651 P.2d 1170, 1173 n.6 (Alaska 1982) (declining to follow Bertelson because the court’s 
interpretation was contrary to express provisions of the Act). 
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is applied, defeating the purpose of the federal legislation.  There is practically 
no way of assessing how frequently this issue has actually slipped through the 
cracks.  It is worth exploring the probable cause for missing these opportunities 
as an instrument for decreasing the level of ignorance among courts 
nationwide.160 
The problem exists, in part, because of the commonly accepted definitions 
pertaining to guardianships and child custody proceedings, coupled with the 
assumption that ICWA is inapplicable.  The Act does not define “guardian”161 
or “guardianship.”  The common legal definition of guardian is “[o]ne who has 
the legal authority and duty to care for another’s person or property, 
[especially] because of the other’s infancy, incapacity, or disability.”162  The 
Supreme Court of Alaska adopted another common definition of the term.163  
The court determined that, in an Indian child guardianship proceeding, a 
guardian is (1) a person who guards, protects or takes care of another person or 
(2) a person legally placed in charge of the affairs of a minor.164  A 
guardianship is defined as “the position and responsibilities of a guardian, 
[especially] toward a ward.”165  The common legal definition of “custody 
hearing” is “a judicial examination of the facts relating to parental custody in a 
divorce or separation proceeding.”166  “Custody” is defined as “[t]he care, 
control, and maintenance of a child awarded by a court to a relative, [usually] 
one of the parents, in a divorce or separation proceeding.”167 
These definitions are far from suggesting that custody of a minor child and 
the guardianship of a minor child are one and the same as ICWA indicates.  
However, there are similarities.  For instance, care for a person because of 
infancy seems substantially related to parenting, an issue in custody hearings.  
 
 160. Proponents of Indian rights commonly invoke the state-tribal relationship argument for 
explaining why Indians have been neglected in a specific area of the law.  That is, both parties 
have interests in controlling land and resources.  But, because tribes have been at a political 
disadvantage for years, state judicial/governmental structures have prevailed in most cases.  See 
generally U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, INDIAN TRIBES: A CONTINUING QUEST FOR 
SURVIVAL 41-43 (June 1981).  While this may be a plausible argument for the issue at hand, it 
will not be the focus of the ensuing analysis. 
 161. See supra text accompanying notes 109-117. 
 162. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (7th ed. 1999).  Guardian is also termed “custodian.”  
See also 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i) (including “conservator” in its definition of foster care 
placement).  Because “guardianships” and “conservatorships” are nearly identical, this Note 
focuses solely on guardianships.  Implicitly,  “conservators” have the same relative rights as do 
guardians under ICWA. 
 163. See J.W. v. R.J., 951 P.2d 1206, 1213 n.12 (Alaska 1998). 
 164. See id. (citing WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 620 (1972)). 
 165. WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 593 (Robert B. Costello ed., 1995). 
 166. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 390 (7th ed. 1999).  There is no legal definition for child 
custody proceeding, the term defined in 25 USC § 1903, thus “custody hearing” is defined in its 
place for the sake of explaining the problem. 
 167. Id. 
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However, the mention of either term does not automatically trigger its 
association with the other.  It is possible that judges and attorneys simply fail 
to think of ICWA as a possibility when a guardianship is at stake because they 
naturally are not considering it within the scope of a custody hearing, or a child 
custody proceeding. 
Similarly, there is a significant difference between adoptions of Indian 
children, which fall under ICWA, and guardianships which do not fall under 
the same provision.  A California appellate court in Jacqueline L. v. Eric L.168 
explained that “[a]doptions are permanent.  For better or worse, the parties are 
stuck with each other.  Not so with guardianships, which can be ended with a 
court hearing.”169 
The same is true when considering “foster care placements,” a subset of 
child custody proceedings under ICWA.170  One legal definition of foster care 
placement is “[t]he [usually temporary] act of placing a child in a home with a 
person or persons who provide parental care of the child.”171  State statutes that 
define terms such as “foster care,” “foster care placement,” or “foster home” 
are rare.  Colorado defines foster care as “the placement of a child into the 
legal custody or legal authority of a county department of social services for 
physical placement of the child in a certified or licensed facility.”172  In Maine, 
long-term foster care is “a foster placement for a child in the custody of the 
department in which the department retains custody of the child while 
delegating to the foster parents the duty and authority to make certain 
decisions.”173  Arizona defines foster home as: “a home maintained by any 
individual or individuals having the care or control of minor children, other 
than those related to each other by blood or marriage, or related to such 
individuals, or who are legal wards of such individuals.”174 
These definitions have a common theme: there is no mention of the word 
guardian or guardianship.  Consequently, while guardianships and foster care 
placements are generally temporary, the perception of foster care placement is 
that it does not include guardianships found within the ICWA definition of 
foster care placement.  Thus, it is not reasonable to believe a court is 
automatically put on notice that ICWA could apply when there is a 
guardianship proceeding. 
A closer analysis of statutory language among various states more clearly 
reveals the idea that there is insufficient notice of potential ICWA applicability 
in guardianship proceedings.  Consider the definition of “custody proceeding” 
 
 168. 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 178 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
 169. Id. at 181. 
 170. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(i). 
 171. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 666 (7th ed. 1999). 
 172. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103 (2000). 
 173. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4064 (West 1999). 
 174. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-501 (1999). 
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in the state of Arizona, one of the most heavily Indian-populated states in the 
union:175 “‘Custody proceeding’ means proceedings in which a custody 
determination is one of several issues, such as an action for divorce or 
dissolution of marriage or separation, and includes child neglect 
proceedings.”176  There is no mention of guardianship within the definition.  
Because the statute uses the words “such as,” the possibility is left open for 
including guardianships within its definition.  But, this possibility is left for the 
court’s discretion.  If the court does not consider a guardianship, then it falls 
outside of the statutory definition.  This augments the tendency of courts to not 
consider whether ICWA is applicable.  Courts are even more likely to overlook 
the definition of “child custody proceeding” within ICWA. 
Analysis of the Michigan statute is very similar.  A custody proceeding 
under Michigan statutory law, “includes proceedings in which a custody 
determination is [one] of several issues including, but not limited to, an action 
for divorce or separation and child neglect and dependency proceedings.”177  In 
Foster v. Stein,178 the court expanded this analysis by holding that adoption 
proceedings are included in the definition of a “custody proceeding.”179  
Nevertheless, there is no reference to guardianship.  The statutory language, 
“but not limited to,” indicates that it is possible for a guardianship to fall within 
the definition.  This determination, however, is left to the court’s discretion.  If 
 
 175. It is worthwhile to discuss Indian population among various states.  In 1990, 1.878 
million persons, representing 0.8% of the nation’s population, reported themselves as Native 
Americans.  Some jurisdictions seldom have reason to consider ICWA because there is a low 
level of Indian residents.  Thus, a lack of familiarity with the Act may be even greater in areas 
such as Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Illinois, Ohio, Virginia, Massachusetts, Tennessee, South 
Carolina, Connecticut, Kentucky, New Hampshire and Indiana where Native Americans compose 
no more than 0.2% of the entire state’s population.  Perhaps, judges from the above listed states 
are even more prone to misconstruing or considering ICWA application.  See generally 
ALMANAC OF THE 50 STATES: BASIC DATA PROFILES WITH COMPARATIVE TABLES (Edith R. 
Hornor ed., 2000). 
  States heavily populated with Native Americans, however, have even greater incentive to 
enact court rules and statutes that provide for clear directives as they pertain to ICWA.  Some of 
the most heavily populated states include: Oklahoma—population 252,089 (representing 8.0% of 
total population); California—population 236,078 (representing 0.8% of total population); 
Arizona—population 203,009 (representing 5.5% of total population); New Mexico—population 
134,097 (representing 8.9% of total population); Alaska—population 31,245 (representing 5.7% 
of total population); South Dakota—population 50,501 (representing 7.3% of total population); 
Montana—population 47,524 (representing 5.9% of total population); and North Dakota—
population 25,870 (representing 4.0% of total population).  Other states which are mentioned in 
this Note include: Michigan—population 55,131 (representing 0.6% of total population); 
Minnesota—population 49,392 (representing 1.1% of total population); Missouri—population 
19,508 (representing 0.4% of total population).  See generally id. 
 176. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-432(3) (2000). 
 177. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.652(c) (2000). 
 178. 454 N.W.2d 244 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990). 
 179. Id. at 246. 
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courts have traditionally excluded “guardianships” from the definition, then 
they are likely to also assume exclusion from coverage under ICWA. 
This explanation cannot be completely persuasive because there are state 
statutes that specifically provide for inclusion of guardianship actions within 
custody proceedings.  For example, the framework of the Missouri statute is as 
follows: “‘Custody proceeding’ includes proceedings in which a custody 
determination is one of several issues, such as an action for dissolution of 
marriage, legal separation, separate maintenance, appointment of a guardian of 
the person, child neglect or abandonment . . . .”180  In these jurisdictions, where 
the state statute actually indicates that guardianships are custody proceedings, 
it seems that judges and lawyers are more likely to be put on notice that ICWA 
may apply.181  The court would then have reason to know it needs to inquire 
into whether the child is of Native American ancestry.182 
B. The Courts’ Role: A Step Further 
Perhaps the problem has come about because some state legislatures have 
not enacted provisions that clearly direct courts to ICWA in applicable 
situations.  However, courts must bear at least as much of the responsibility as 
legislators.  The issue of whether ICWA applies to minor guardianship 
proceedings could become conspicuous with the enactment of court rules that 
address ICWA’s applicability.  The court rules of Michigan are illustrative of 
the inadequate direction taken by some state court rules as they pertain to child 
custody hearings. 
In Michigan, court rules, rather than legislation, address ICWA issues.183  
At the outset of a child protective proceeding, a preliminary hearing must be 
conducted where a number of items are addressed.184  One procedural 
provision mandates that the court “inquire if the child or parent is a registered 
member of any American Indian tribe or band, or if the child is eligible for 
 
 180. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.445 (2000) (emphasis added). 
 181. The Oklahoma statute is another example of a “notice” statute.  The language provides 
that “‘[c]hild custody proceeding’ means a proceeding in which legal custody, physical custody, 
or visitation with respect to a child is an issue.  The term includes a proceeding for divorce, 
separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, 
and protection from domestic violence . . . .” OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 551-102 (West 1999) 
(emphasis added).  Note that Oklahoma, like Arizona, is one of the more heavily Indian-
populated states making the inconsistency among the states even more perplexing. 
 182. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text (explaining the proper application of 
ICWA). 
 183. See MICH. CT. R. 5.965, 5.980. 
 184. See MICH. CT. R. 5.965(B)-(C) (including procedures for reading the petition in open 
court, determining if the petition should be dismissed, advising the parties of their rights, 
allowing respondent the opportunity to admit or deny allegations, authorizing the filing of the 
petition and determining pre-trial placement of the minor child). 
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such membership.”185  If this is the case, the court must then “determine and 
notify the tribe or band and follow the procedures [for child custody 
proceedings concerning American Indian children].”186  This language directs 
the court to provisions set forth under another court rule, which states that “[i]f 
any Indian child as defined by the Indian Child Welfare Act [25 U.S.C. §§ 
1901-63] is the subject of a protective proceeding or is charged with an offense 
in violation of [certain juvenile delinquency statutes],”187 then the procedures 
enumerated within the rule must be applied.188 
The provisions make reference to ICWA, and they make reference to child 
custody proceedings concerning Indian children.  Surprisingly, however, the 
rules are not structured to guide, much less instruct, a judge to consider ICWA 
if a guardianship proceeding is at bar or if there is a custody dispute between 
natural Indian parents and third parties.  The construction of the rule becomes 
even more peculiar when considering what is included within it.  Michigan 
Court Rule 5.980 mingles ICWA with child protective proceedings and 
delinquency proceedings.  A child protective proceeding concerns “an offense 
against a child,”189 but it is not explicitly a category of child custody 
proceeding under ICWA.190  Furthermore, ICWA does not apply to 
delinquency placements.  A delinquency proceeding, in Michigan, concerns 
“an offense against a juvenile.”191  An “act which, if committed by an adult, 
would be deemed a crime” is not subject to ICWA.192  Nevertheless, the courts 
of Michigan borrow the federal definition of “Indian child”193 and combine it 
with the state’s court rule language pertaining to protective proceedings and 
delinquency proceedings.194  This combination of law is used to ascertain 
whether the procedures within the court rule handling child custody 
proceedings concerning American Indian children apply.195 
Studying this explicit language in the court rule, the concern then becomes 
apparent. A judge may easily overlook the possibility of ICWA application to 
guardianships and other custody battles involving third parties and the natural 
parents inasmuch as those court rules are otherwise silent. 
 
 185. MICH. CT. R. 5.965(B)(7). 
 186. Id. 
 187. MICH. CT. R. 5.980(A) (emphasis added). 
 188. See id. 
 189. MICH. CT. R. 5.903(A)(2). 
 190. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1). 
 191. MICH. CT. R. 5.903(A)(3). 
 192. Id.  See also supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 193. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (“‘Indian child’ means any unmarried person who is under age 
eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an 
Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe . . . .”). 
 194. See MICH. CT. R. 5.980(A). 
 195. See id. 
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C. The Hierarchy of Power: Guardianship Rights vis-à-vis Parental Rights 
Even if an Indian child is involved in a guardianship-related child custody 
proceeding, ICWA does not apply in all guardianships.  The guardianship at 
issue must be one that does not allow for the return of the child upon demand 
of the non-guardian parent.196  In this situation, a significant amount of power 
is granted to the guardian as compared to the natural parent.  This lopsided 
balance of power must exist for ICWA to apply.197  If a state statute allows the 
parent to demand the child back under any circumstances, then the 
guardianship does not lie within the definition of foster care placement and, 
thus, is not a child custody proceeding signaling ICWA application. 
The key inquiry involves the comparison between the rights of the 
guardian and the rights of the custodial parent.  When the parent has 
relinquished custody but the parental rights have not been terminated by the 
court, as was the case in A.K.H.,198 S.B.R.199 and Ashley Elizabeth R.,200 state 
statutory law heavily favors the guardian.201  Accordingly, this most likely 
 
 196. 25 U.S.C. 1903(1)(i).  See also supra notes 10, 89 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra text accompanying notes 101-130 for illustrations of this balance of power.  
See also text accompanying notes 131-153 for a discussion of Stevens v. Redwing, 146 F.3d 538 
(8th Cir. 1998), the non-ICWA case which presents similar guardianship issues as those being 
discussed in this section.  This is the type of guardianship ICWA is intended to govern if the child 
involved is an Indian child. 
  In Stevens, the guardianship of the grandparents did not allow for Stevens to demand the 
child back if he desired.  At best, explained the court, the father could have undertaken a separate 
action in Missouri probate court to terminate the guardianship and to restore his right to custody.  
See id. at 544.  Ultimately, though, no immediate return of the child to the father was possible.  
Stevens did make various motions and appealed the order of termination of guardianship in the 
Missouri probate court, following the instructions set out in the statute.  See id. at 542.  Thus, the 
actions of the Missouri probate court were the real focus of the examination.  The federal court 
was not responsible for the decision made in the Missouri court.  See id. at 544.  Furthermore, the 
actual interests of the child were not in question in the federal court action; the issue was whether 
the defendant was liable to the father in tort. 
  The proceedings in the probate court illustrate a situation where a missed opportunity to 
apply ICWA can occur.  Assuming Jami Lynn was not an Indian child, no application of ICWA 
was relevant.  However, if the child were Indian, the court would have to be aware that the 
guardianship was one that met the definition of “child custody proceeding” under ICWA.  At that 
point, all the procedural and substantive aspects of the law would come into play.  Most 
importantly, the tribal court would have to be put on notice, so it would have the opportunity to 
become involved in the action. 
 198. In re A.K.H., 502 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
 199. In re S.B.R., 719 P.2d 154 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986). 
 200. In re Ashley Elizabeth R., 863 P.2d 451 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). 
 201. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.084(e) (Michie 2000) (“When there has been transfer 
of legal custody or appointment of a guardian and parental rights have not been terminated by 
court decree, the parents shall have residual rights and responsibilities,” not including the right to 
have the child returned upon demand.); CAL. PROB. CODE § 2351 (Deering 2000) (stating that, 
subject to limitations on care, custody and control determined by the court, “the guardian or 
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means that the parent could not demand the return of the child.  Thus, in most 
states, the court must conclude that ICWA applies if in fact the child is deemed 
to be an Indian.  If parental rights have not been terminated, statutes are not 
always clear as to whether the child can be returned upon demand.  Most of 
these statutes allow judicial discretion to determine the rights and 
responsibilities of the parties.202  If this is the case, then the statute does not 
specify whether the non-custodial parent(s) still can demand the release of the 
child from the guardian.  This is an unsettling issue which courts have not 
addressed.  Nevertheless, what is clear is that, if (1) the parent cannot demand 
the child back and (2) the child is an Indian, ICWA applies.  If the parent can 
demand the child back, regardless of whether the child is an Indian, ICWA 
does not apply. 
D. Applying ICWA When State Law Ambiguously Defines a Guardianship 
Assuming that the court is able to correctly recognize that ICWA may 
apply to a guardianship proceeding and it correctly construes the federal 
provisions, specifically 25 U.S.C. §§ 1903 and 1913, a state statute or court 
rule may be ambiguous as to whether a child can be returned upon demand.203  
As discussed in In re J.B., “the nature of the proceeding is determined by what 
is pending or potentially pending before the state court.”204  This means that 
the state court has both the authority and the obligation to determine the type 
of proceeding before it.  Relying on its own law, the court often lacks the 
applicable rules to characterize a proceeding.  There is no case law determining 
whether ICWA applies in these ambiguous situations.  Without an agreement 
between the parties specifying whether the child can be returned upon 
 
conservator, has the care, custody, and control of . . . the ward or conservatee.”).  See also COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 15-14-312 (2000); IDAHO CODE § 15-5-209 (Michie 2000); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
405/1-3 (2000); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.15215 (Michie 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-31 
(Michie 2000). 
 202. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-871(D) (2000) (“Unless otherwise set forth in the final 
order of permanent guardianship, a permanent guardian is vested with all rights and 
responsibilities set forth in [other sections of the statutes] . . . .”).  This statute gives the court 
primary authority to decide rights of the parties.  If the court does not specify, then statutory law 
controls.  For an example of a state which handles this matter slightly differently by allowing a 
recommendation from a state agency to be submitted to the court, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-
338 (Michie 1999). 
 203. Michigan is one state where the statute and court rules lend no direction in this regard to 
child custody proceedings.  Interestingly, however, the child protective proceedings are more 
detailed in regard to problems of similar nature. 
 204. In re J.B., 900 P.2d 1014, 1017 (Okla. Ct. App. 1995) (referring to §§ 1903 and 1911(b) 
of the Act). 
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demand,205 a court is entirely left to itself to determine whether ICWA applies.  
Considering the statutory construction of ICWA, courts should rule that, if a 
statute or court rule lacks clarity, and it cannot be determined that a parent 
cannot take the child back upon demand, there is a presumption that the child 
cannot be returned, and, consequently, ICWA applies.  Subsequently, the 
proceeding should be halted until the tribe is put on notice.206 
Arriving at this conclusion, the underlying principle is that 
Congress through the Indian Child Welfare Act has expressed its clear 
preference for keeping Indian children with families, deferring to tribal 
judgment on matters concerning the custody of tribal children, and placing 
Indian children who must be removed from their homes within their own 
families or Indian tribes.  Proceedings in state courts involving the custody of 
Indian children shall follow strict procedures and meet stringent requirements 
to justify any result in an individual case contrary to these preferences.  The 
Indian Child Welfare Act, the federal regulations implementing the Act, the 
recommended guidelines and any state statutes, regulations or rules 
promulgated to implement the Act shall be liberally construed in favor of a 
result that is consistent with these preferences.207 
While, admittedly, the state rules defining proceedings such as guardianships 
and other foster care placements were not enacted for the specific purpose of 
catering to the needs of American Indians, it can easily be accepted that 
Congress, through ICWA, delegated some decision-making power to the 
states, so long as the principles of ICWA are instilled in their decisions.  Thus, 
in deciding if the federal act applies, state court rules or, in this case, statutes 
are to be construed to favor ICWA application, because ICWA was enacted for 
the sole purpose of benefiting American Indian tribes, families, and children. 
A second reason for applying ICWA when state law is unclear whether the 
guardianship allows for return of the child on demand is because it follows the 
historical approach in the interpretation of other provisions of the Act.  
Consider these three instances:  first, if a parent asserts the possibility of Indian 
membership, the predominate approach is to assume this to be true until the 
tribe or other proper authority establishes that no Indian membership exists 
 
 205. See supra text accompanying notes 135 and 148-49 (discussing existence of written 
agreement between parties in Stevens).  See also supra text accompanying note 99 (discussing 
existence of agreement between parties in D.E.D.). 
 206. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a).  See also supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text; see supra 
text accompanying note 117. 
 207. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,854, 
67,585-86 (Nov. 26, 1979).  See also In re K.L.R.F., 515 A.2d 33, 37 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). 
(“statutes enacted to benefit American Indians must be liberally construed with all doubts 
resolved in favor of the Indian seeking its benefits or protections”). 
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among the parties.208  Second, ICWA requires transfer to tribal courts absent 
good cause.209  While the Act does not define “good cause,” practically all 
courts have adopted the Bureau of Indian Affairs definition, which restricts 
state courts.210  Third, if the Indian child is not domiciled within an Indian 
reservation or is not a ward of the tribal court, there is still a presumption of 
tribal jurisdiction.211  These historical approaches to applying the Act suggest a 
consistent interpretation that favors tribal involvement. 
The liberal construction requirement and the historical interpretation of the 
Act suggest one common theme:  ICWA is typically presumed to apply and the 
tribal court must be put on notice.  This theme should permeate throughout all 
provisions, including § 1903(1)(i).  This becomes even more apparent when 
considering that to rule otherwise would run afoul of the purposes of the Act: 
to preserve Indian heritage and properly determine the child’s best interest. 
E. The Effects of Missed Opportunities to Apply ICWA 
The stated purpose of ICWA is “to protect the best interests of Indian 
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families 
by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for removal of Indian 
children [from their homes].”212  In regard to the Indian child, what is clearly 
lost is any consideration of the unique best interests standard established by 
ICWA.213  By including some guardianships under the definition of “child 
custody proceeding,” Congress has communicated its belief that children in 
these proceedings are no different from children involved in adoption 
placement or custody proceedings.  It seems illogical to think that an Indian 
child involved, for instance, in an adoption proceeding is entitled to more 
protection from the tribe.  Or, put another way, there is no justification for 
providing an Indian child in a guardianship proceeding less protection than a 
child in an adoption proceeding. 
Nonetheless, state statutes and court rules leave room for this to occur.  
Thus, the potential for cultural bias greatly increases in guardianship matters 
involving Indian children.  This clearly frustrates Congress’s belief that Indian 
children present a special situation where the tribal heritage has much positive 
impact on the child.  Furthermore, if the tribe is not put on notice, then it is 
 
 208. See Helen Ann Yunis & Katherine Scotta, The Indian Child Welfare Act: A Case Study, 
2 MICH. CHILD WELFARE J. 14, 15 (1998). 
 209. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). 
 210. See supra text accompanying note 77; Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody 
Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. at 67,854. 
 211. See Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989); see also 25 
U.S.C. § 1911(b). 
 212. 25 U.S.C. § 1902; see also supra text accompanying note 81. 
 213. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text (discussing the Indian child’s best 
interest). 
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impossible for the tribe to offer any assistance to the child.  Tribes often 
provide counseling services and other resources to Indian children and families 
during the course of these types of proceedings.214  These sources could 
potentially alleviate some of the psychological strain on the child, provide 
assistance to parents with substance abuse problems or abusive behavior and 
even help avoid separation of the family. 
Not only do these missed opportunities to apply ICWA affect Indian 
children, such circumstances hinder Indian tribes in seeing that ICWA’s 
purposes are met.  First and quite obviously, without knowledge that the 
proceeding is taking place, tribes cannot intervene to bid for keeping the child 
within the tribe.  This again frustrates the statute’s purpose to provide a means 
for preserving the Indian heritage.  In this regard, the tribes have a significant 
interest in the member children.215 
Second, tribes face problems intervening if it is discovered that they should 
have been put on notice at the commencement of the proceeding because it was 
determined that an Indian child was involved.216  Because Congress intended 
to increase tribal participation, the litigation will be prolonged, complicated 
and more costly.217  This has been a historical problem with the Act.218  For 
instance, in In re Elliott,219 in the middle of a proceeding to terminate parental 
rights, the trial court became aware that the child involved belonged to an 
Indian tribe.220  The court had already heard testimony from expert witnesses 
from Catholic Family Services.221  Nevertheless, it adjourned the proceedings 
 
 214. See Douglas R. Nazarian, Catholic Social Services Inc. v. C.A.A.: Best Interests and 
Statutory Construction of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 7 ALASKA L. REV. 203, 219 n.93 (1990). 
This contravenes the clear language of [§] 1912(d): Any party seeking to effect a . . . 
termination of parental rights to an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the court that 
active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs 
designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved 
unsuccessful. 
Id.  
 215. See id. at 214. 
 216. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (giving the Indian child’s tribe the right to intervene at any point 
in the proceeding). 
 217. See Nazarian, supra note 214, at 214. 
 218. While excessive litigation has been a historical problem with the Act, some states, like 
Michigan, have enacted court rules to alleviate the problem.  Under MICH. COURT RULE 
5.965(B)(7), a judge is required to ask if the child or either parent is a member of an American 
Indian tribe or band.  Additionally, the petitioner must use a form with a pre-printed paragraph, 
which requires the petitioner to list tribal affiliation.  This reduces the likelihood of discovering 
heritage later in the proceedings. 
 219. 554 N.W.2d 32 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996). 
 220. See id. at 33. The court did not recognize the child as an Indian child when the 
proceeding began because it did not follow the explicit directive in MICH. COURT RULE 
5.965(B)(7) to inquire about the mother’s or the minor child’s tribal status.  See id. at 38. 
 221. Id. at 33-34. 
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for further investigation of the issue and to notify the Chippewa Tribe.222  The 
tribe petitioned the court to intervene, which the court allowed.223  Ultimately, 
in terminating the child’s parental rights, the court determined that although 
the child was an Indian and the Act was applicable, complying with certain 
provisions that would necessitate more litigation was not necessary.224  The 
court’s rationale was that the child had not been brought up as an Indian child 
in an Indian family,225 and thus it did not “justif[y] a basis for delaying a 
decision in this case.”226  Since the mother was not intimately involved with 
her tribe, the benefits of allowing expert testimony at that juncture were not 
enough to outweigh the benefits of continuing the proceeding without such 
testimony. 
The matter came before the state appellate court, which determined that the 
lower court had committed clear legal error in interpreting ICWA.227  The 
court squarely rejected the “existing Indian family” exception in accordance 
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. 
Holyfield.228  The court was concerned with the direct conflict the exception 
had with Congress’s purpose of ensuring Indian cultural preservation.229  
ICWA clearly mandates that any foster care placement or termination of 
parental rights action be invalidated upon a showing by any parent, Indian 
custodian or the child’s Indian tribe that the action violated any provision of §§ 
1911-13, which pertain to tribal jurisdiction, parental rights, voluntary 
termination and, the matter in this case, pending court proceedings.230  
Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the action for a new hearing to 
allow for thorough compliance with the Act. 
 
 222. Id. at 34. 
 223. See id. 
 224. Most notably, the respondent argued, inter alia, that since no qualified expert testimony 
had taken place, a new trial was necessary.  See Elliott, 554 N.W.2d at 34.  § 1912(e) provides 
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[n]o foster care placement may be ordered in such proceeding in the absence of a 
determination, supported by clear and convincing evidence, including testimony of 
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custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. 
25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (emphasis added).  The trial court, because of the phase of the proceeding, 
rejected this argument.  See Elliott, 554 N.W. 2d at 34. 
 225. See Elliot, 554 N.W.2d at 33-34. At the time of trial, the child was three and one-half 
years old.  The father was not affiliated with any tribe or band, but the mother was a member of 
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 226. Id. at 34. 
 227. See id. at 35. 
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The Chippewa Tribe, not to mention all parties in the action, became 
involved in needless litigation—litigation that could have been avoided had it 
been discovered at the beginning of the proceeding that ICWA applied.  This 
problem has existed since the Act’s inception in 1978 and poses a threat to 
actions involving guardianship and custody disputes between third parties and 
the biological Indian parents. 
VI.  CONCLUSION:  THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL ALERTNESS TO POTENTIAL ICWA 
SITUATIONS 
The inappropriate attention courts give ICWA guardianships does not 
imply that state courts have entirely failed to adhere to ICWA, causing a 
collapse of the fundamental objectives of the Act.  Indeed, it is impossible to 
monitor the frequency of cases being overlooked involving an Indian child in a 
guardianship matter.  However, this problem to which many courts may be 
oblivious invites, at the very least, difficulties in isolated circumstances.  
Familiarization with the Act is the first step toward prevention.  Indian 
populations are continuing to grow.  Therefore, there is reason to believe 
courts will be called upon to apply the Act with greater frequency.  
Unfortunately, the inadequate attention to which guardianship matters are 
prone in regard to ICWA demonstrates the overall lack of understanding of the 
Act. 
Congress has clearly called for tribal involvement, specifically the 
possibility of tribal court jurisdiction and the tribal notice requirement, through 
the enactment of ICWA.  Applying the Act in guardianship proceedings 
provides a means for this involvement.  This involvement can be more easily 
procured through enactment of state court rules and statutes which direct a 
person to ICWA and amendments to guardianship or which clearly specify 
whether a non-custodial parent can receive the child upon demand.  Such 
enactments augment congressional intent, as well as the underlying purpose of 
the Act itself. 
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